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Abstract—In this work, we propose a NoC which enforces the
encapsulation of sensitive traffic inside the asymmetrical security
zones while using minimal and non-minimal paths. The NoC
routes guarantee that the sensitive traffic is communicated only
through the trusted nodes which belong to the security zone.
As the shape of the zones may change during operation, the
sensitive traffic must be routed through low-risk paths. We test
our proposal and we show that our solution can be an efficient
and scalable alternative for enforce the data protection inside the
MPSoC.
Index Terms—MPSoCs, Network-on-Chip, Security, Zones,
Encapsulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-Processors System-on-Chip (MPSoCs) are character-
ized by their flexibility and high computational capabilities.
They integrate dozens of computation and storage Intellectual
Property (IP) cores, which exchange information through a
Network-on-Chip (NoC). Packets are exchanged from a source
IP to a destination IP by means of a set of routers and links.
MPSoCs are able to support several applications which may
be stored on chip or downloaded through external networks as
the Internet. The application is spread over the IPs of the MP-
SoC. Due performance and power constrains, such mapping
may change during execution time. For critical applications,
splitting the application into several IPs forces the sensitive
data exchanging through the shared an unprotected NoC. This
exposes data to attacks as shown in [1], [2].
MPSoCs are now target of several attacks. Malicious entities
profit of the hyper-connectivity of Internet-of-Things (IoT) to
download malware onto the MPSoC and infect IPs. Such kind
of remote software-based attacks account for 70% of the secu-
rity incidents in MPSoCs. Remote timing attacks belong to this
category. Such attacks exploit the leakage caused by shared
resources of the MPSoC: processing elements, memories and
the communication structure. Sensitive communication at NoC
must be protected. The work of [3] shows that by exploiting
NoC communication collisions among sensitive and the at-
tacker traffic, the secret key of the sensitive application may
be retrieved.
Previous works have shown that NoCs can be enhanced
with security mechanisms in order to prevent and mitigate at-
tacks. Firewalls, customized network protocols and customized
routers are used to built security zones. These zones encapsu-
late the sensitive traffic into trusted areas. They are constituted
by a set of trusted IPs and routers, in which only sensitive
and trusted traffic is exchanged. Thus, avoiding collisions with
malicious traffic. Customizing the router by means of routing
modification is one of the most effective techniques to built
security zones and protect the traffic [2], [3]. In [2] the authors
propose dynamic risk-based routing to encapsulate the traffic
in low-risk paths. The risk value is provided by the number
of firewall activations. Despite the fast runtime configuration,
the lowest-risk path can not be guaranteed due the minimal
path constraint. In [3] a design time approach based on region
routing is used for guaranteeing the encapsulation of traffic
inside asymmetric security zones. However, this approach is
not suitable for reshaping the security zones at runtime.
In order to overcome such drawbacks, in this work we NOE-
RNoC, an architecture that combines region-based routing
(design time) and non-minimal adaptive routing (runtime) to
efficiently encapsulate sensitive traffic.
The contributions of this work are:
• Implementation of a non-minimal adaptive routing tech-
nique guided by the security metric: risk of the hop.
• Fast reconfiguration of a region-based routing
• Evaluation of performance, cost and security.
This paper is divided into seven sections. Section II presents
the previous works on NoC-based security. Section III de-
scribes the MPSoC and the threat model. Section IV presents
the mechanisms for security zones protection. Section V
presents the architecture of NOE-RNoC. Section VI shows the
experimental work and results. Finally, Section VII presents
the conclusions.
II. RELATED WORKS
Security integration at NoC-based architectures has been
shown as an effective solution to protect heterogeneous MP-
SoCs. Such mechanisms avoid unauthorized data modification,
extraction and system service deny. Security zones can be
implemented though the NoC resources. The goal is to protect
the MPSoC by encapsulating the sensitive traffic into trusted
areas. The works of [3], [4] use routing to encapsulate the
sensitive traffic. The authors of [3] present a region-based
routing approach based on the security characteristics of the
application. Despite the good results, it does not consider
security zone reshaping during runtime. In the work of [4] the
risk metric is used to guide the routing of sensitive traffic. The
risk of the path is evaluated at the destination interface. When
a risk threshold is exceeded a new low-risk path is explored.
Four routing alternatives are used (deterministic, hop-based,
weighted and bounded). All these routing algorithms are
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Fig. 1: Example of a 16-IP cores MPSoC.
constrained by the minimal path, thus restricting the search
of low-risk paths.
III. MPSOC DESCRIPTION AND THREAT MODEL
MPSoCs integrate a set of IP cores that process and store
data in order to execute an application. Such application are
divided into tasks and split on the IPs of the MPSoC. The
communication among the IPs is performed through the NoC,
a network of routers and links inside the chip. Fig. 1 shows
an example of an MPSoC of 16-IP cores linked through a 16-
router NoC. The communication between the IP target (IPt)
linked at router (R3) and IP source (IPs) linked at router (R9)
requires 5 commutations on the NoC (R9, R10, R11, R7, R3).
We consider that the MPSoC executes a sensitive (S) and
other types of applications simultaneously in the same chip.
S is split into the cores IP9 and IP3, thus forcing the
communication of sensitive data through the NoC (1). The
NoC path used to communicate the sensitive data is called
sensitive path. The sensitive path of Fig. 1 is constituted by
the routers (R9, R10, R11, R7, R3). The NoC and interfaces
are considered secure. That is, the attacker cannot modify their
behavior.
The attacker can infect the IP cores by executing a malicious
application (M) into the MPSoC. Malicious task may be
installed on an IP, thus turning it into an infected IP (IPI). Fig.
1 shows the infected IP7, which is linked directly to a router
inside the sensitive path. The attacker is able to control the
traffic injection and to monitor the IPI throughput. As showed
in [5], [6], an attacker may exploit communication collisions
between the sensitive and malicious traffic to perform timing
attacks. Collisions allow that the attacker recognizes the traffic
pattern of the sensitive traffic by means of the degradation of
the throughput of the (IPI). The collision in Fig. 1 takes place
at R7 (2). As a result, the authors of [5] have shown that by
observing the traffic due 76 AES encryption, IPI is able to
retrieve 12 of the 16 bytes of the secret key. Complementary
brute force attack can be used to reveal the complete secret
key.
In order to perform the attack, the following preconditions
are required:
• Attacker is able to infect an IP of the MPSoC.
• Attacker can control the traffic generation and monitoring
of the infected IP.
• Infected IP is in the sensitive path.
IV. MECHANISMS FOR SECURITY ZONES PROTECTION
A security zone SZ is a physical space (continuous or
disrupted) that wraps and isolates the IPs that execute sensitive
applications. IPs that belong to the SZ are considered trusted
among them. The task mapping of sensitive applications inside
the MPSoC defines the shape of the SZ. However, if a trusted
IP is attacked or the mapping of the application is modified at
runtime, the SZ must be reshaped. In order to create the SZ,
the NoC routing can be employed. The routing logic selects
the router output for the granted input. Therefore, it can be
used to restrict the communication through the hops inside the
security zone. Reshaping the SZ implies into the NoC routing
modification in runtime. The new route must be secure.
Firewalls embodied in the NoC interfaces are commonly
used to protect the traffic and enforce the security policy of
the system. This information can be use to detect possible
points of attack and to drive the runtime modification of the
NoC routing. Fig. 1 shows an initial continuous SZ0 (1)
that includes the (IP9, IP10, IP11, IP7, IP3). However, IP7
is infected at runtime and detected by the firewalls (2), which
trigger a reshape of the SZ. The infected IP is removed from
the SZ and a new disrupted SZ is created (SZRT ) as in
(3). A new sensitive path is computed (4), which requires 7
commutations on the NoC (R9, R10, R6, R5, R1, R2, R3). In
this work we propose the architecture able to establish and
modify SZ as well as to reroute the sensitive traffic through
non-minimal routes driven by the risk level of each hop.
In this paper we propose a NoC architecture able to support
dynamic security zones and protected communications inside
the MPSoC by combining a region-based routing (at design
time) and Non-minimal Odd-Even routing (at runtime).
A. Region-based routing (design time)
The region-based routing forces that the communication
paths of any pair of IP cores that belong to the same security
zone is performed inside the zone. Determining the routes
inside a region while guaranteeing deadlock-free routes is a
complex task. The Segment-based Routing (SBR) and Region-
based Routing (RBR) algorithms are used to determine the
routes for encapsulating the traffic into a region. SBR is
responsible for deadlock prevention and IP cores reachability,
while RBR computes the routing tables. SBR is composed
of two steps: (i) segment computation, that splits the NoC
into segments characterized by a turn restriction to avoid
deadlocks; and (ii) placement of routing restrictions. RBR uses
the turn restrictions computed by SBR to find paths between
all origins and destinations in the NoC. It includes three steps:
i) routing computation, for each source-target IP cores pair; ii)
region computation, that joins at each router multiple routing
entries based on the input and output port values; and iii)
region merge, which merges overlapping routing entries in
order to reduce the size of the routing tables. Designer can
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Fig. 2: Non-minimal adaptive odd-even turn model (NOE).
decide the IP core members of the SZ and the mapping on
the MPSoC. The SBR is used to compute the segments and
turn restrictions required to keep the traffic inside a security
zone. The goal is to create the smallest possible segments
that contain elements from the same security zone. The RBR
searches the paths between each pair of IPs and IPt and
creates the routing tables (RBR tables) for each hop. Such a
network of hopes constitute the RNoC. More details about the
algorithm can be found in [3].
The high complexity of SBR and RBR turns prohibitive
the utilization of such algorithms in runtime. Thus, when the
security changes, a lighter approach must be used to find a
low-risk path for the sensitive traffic.
B. Non-minimal Odd-Even NOE routing (runtime time)
NOE is a low-cost adaptive routing algorithm, able to follow
different paths between a given IPs, IPt pair. It is a deadlock-
free adaptive approach that restricts the locations at which the
turns can be performed. It is based on two rules [7]:
• Rule1: Any packet is not allowed to take an E−N turn
at any nodes located in an even column, and it is not
allowed to take an N −W turn at any nodes located in
an odd column.
• Rule2: Any packet is not allowed to take an E − S turn
at any nodes located in an even column, and it is not
allowed to take an S −W turn at any nodes located in
an odd column.
The behavior of NOE is shown in Fig. 2. NOE analyzes
and compares the packet destination (d0, d1) and the current
router position (c0, c1) in order to select the proper router
output port. Packets can be routed adaptively in East, West,
North or South directions. NOE can be used to find a low-risk
path for sensitive packets at runtime. The routing decision
can be driven by the risk value of the hops. At the NOE-
RNoC, each hop quantifies the weighted risk value of the four
quadrants as shown in [4]. The value of the neighbors’ risk
together with the turn restriction, are taken into account to
select the next hop. This technique avoids that the packets are
trapped into dangerous paths. Each time the risk value of a
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Fig. 3: Microarchitecture of SNI and Hops.
hop is updated, the new value is broadcasted into the NoC
hops that belong to the column and row. The implementation
of adaptive routing may present higher costs when compared
to deterministic approaches. However, adaptation may become
mandatory for reliability purposes and so the cost overhead
acceptable.
V. NOC ARCHITECTURE
In this paper we propose NOE-RNoC, a security enhanced
NoC to protect sensitive traffic inside the MPSoC. Sensitive
traffic is encapsulated dynamically through low-risk paths
inside a security zone. At design time, the region-based routing
NoC (RNoC) is used to determine the routing table. At
runtime, new sensitive paths are created through NOE routing
driven by the risk metric. The protected NOE-RNoC is based
on a two-level NoC composed of three main components:
Secure network interfaces (SNI), Hops and Security Manager
(SM). Their microarchitecture is shown in Fig. 3.
Secure network interfaces (SNIs): They implement the
communication protocol (pack/unpack, route table, control)
and security checking by means of firewalls (security table).
The packet structure is composed of 6 fields: i) source, to
identify IPs; ii) destination, to identify IPt; iii) route, to store
the secure route; iv) risk threshold, contains the maximum
risk allowed per hop; v) operation, to identify the type of
packet (control, data write, data read); and vi) payload, that
is the data to be exchanged. The communication security is
enforced by the firewall-based traffic inspection. Each time
a packet is injected or received, the security checking is
performed. At the source IP, the access control is performed
by verifying the destination and operation fields of the packet.
At the destination IP, the authentication is performed by
checking the source and operation fields. When the security
rules are violated, the firewall generates a notification which
will increase the risk value of the hop: i) at source hop, when
the attack is identified at the source network interface; or ii)
at the hops used by the malicious packet, when the attack
is identified at the destination network interface. Each time a
new application is mapped on the system, the risk level of the
hops linked to the modified IPs is restarted.
Hops: Integrate the Data Routers (DR) and Control
Routers (CR) to exchange data and control signals. It also
includes the RISK logic block, used to quantify and store
the risk value of each hop as in [4]. Fig. 3 shows the router
structure. The difference between DRs and CRs is the link
size and the routing implementation. DRs route the packets
by means of the RBR tables, or by source routing (data inside
the route field of the packet). CRs use the RBR tables and
NOE (used only for seeker packets). Each hop stores two risk
values: localrisk (hop risk) and quadrantrisk (risk of the
line and column neighbors). Local risk is used to determine
if a hop is dangerous. Each time a sensitive packet uses a
DR, the local risk is compared to the risk threshold value. If
exceeded, the packet is sent back to the IPs and the Security
Manager is notified. The quadrant risk is used for the NOE
routing. Quadrants that force the transition between security
zones are penalized in order to favor the routing inside a single
security zone.
Security manager (SM): It is a light software layer
executed in a trusted IP in charge of configuration of the
firewalls and control of the recovery mechanism under a
possible attack. It includes the untrusted hop removal from
a security zone.
During execution, the risk of a hop can be measured as
in [4]. The risk is defined as the probability that a malicious
process spies, denials the communication or corrupts the data
in a NoC hop. The risk is measured by the amount of firewall
notifications due the violation of security rules. When the risk
of a hop inside the SZ overcomes the RISKlevel value,
defined by the designer, the hop is removed from the SZ.
Therefore, the IP cores of the SZ that use the removed hop
must search for an alternative low-risk path. These IPs inject a
seeker packet which is commuted through the CR. The routing
decision at each hope is based on the NOE algorithm that
includes the risk value of each hop of the NoC. The route
is stored by the seeker packet and then stored into the source
route table of the SNI. The remove of the hops and the control
of the seek process is performed by the security manager (SM).
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
NOE-RNoC is modelled in SystemC-TLM and VHDL-RTL
by extending the NoC design framework presented in [4].
SHOC is a modular cycle accurate simulation environment
which supports a wide variety of components required for
MPSoC simulation. This environment includes libraries of
MPSoC attacks and tools for power and area estimation.
NOE has been evaluated under three conditions: scalability,
performance and security. NOE-RNoC is compared with the
approaches proposed in [4].
Fig. 4 shows the impact of setting a new route by using the
NOE and the previous approaches for different NoC sizes. The
path length is equivalent to the diameter of the NoC. Results
are expressed as a percentage of the exhaustive route search.
Lower latency values represent efficient routing techniques.
Results show that NOE is scalable. Only hop-based and deter-
ministic approaches overcome NOE. These approaches do not
require the risk status broadcasting. Oblivious neighbor risk
approaches may limit the search of low-risk paths. Among the
approaches where hops are aware of the NoC risk (weighted
and bounded), NOE presents the best performance. NOE
enhances the performance up to 8% and 15%, respectively,
when compared to the weighted and bounded approaches.
The performance evaluation was carried out on an MPSoC
that supports 5 applications (MG, IS, LU, FT, CG) of the
NASA Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation (NAS) Bench-
mark. Fig. 5 shows the MPSoC mapping obtained by Cafes
[8]. This tool optimizes the MPSoC mapping according to
performance and power metrics. Each application is grouped
into a single and continuous security zone. During operation
time, 2 IP cores from each security region start to behave
malicious. This experiment emulates the presence of hardware
Trojans on the MPSoC. Thus, the routing inside the security
regions must be modified.
Fig. 6 shows the performance result of the NOE-RNoC
under uniform traffic with different injection rates. The path
reconfiguration was forced during 25% of the operation time.
The results show that NOE achieves the best performance
results, overcoming the hop-based approach. Despite NOE-
RNoC requires the broadcast of the risk values of the hops
in order to quantify the quadrant risk, the performance of the
applications is not affected. NOE employs the CR for all the
extra communication. Moreover, the path found by the hop-
based approach falls into infected hops that were performing
timing attack (heavy traffic injection to detect the degradation
of throughput), thus degrading the performance of the sensitive
path. NOE, was able to avoid such hops.
The area, power and performance overhead of the security
mechanisms are summarized in Table I as a percentage of the
penalty of each configuration when compared to the MPSoC
without protection. Results show that NOE presents the best
trade-off among the alternatives that are NoC risk-aware.
For the security evaluation, our approach was evaluated
under four kinds of attacks. Table II shows the results of
the security evaluation. Higher values of attack avoidance
represent a better level of protection. Results show that NOE
and Bounded approaches achieve the highest protection levels
for all the attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we propose NOE-RNoC, a security enhanced
NoC architecture that combines region routing and non-
minimal risk-based routing technique to encapsulate sensi-
tive traffic through low-risk paths. We present three main
contributions. Firstly, we implement a non-minimal routing
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Fig. 5: Mapping of NAS benchmark in the MPSoC.
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Fig. 6: performance results.
technique driven by low-risk metric. Secondly, we show that
our architecture is able to protect the sensitive traffic even
when some IP cores inside the security zones are tampered.
Thus NOE-RNoC is able to find at runtime. Thirdly, we
show that our NOE-RNoC is efficient and able to protect
the sensitive traffic. Future work aims to explore other non-
adaptive weighted routing techniques for finding secure paths
efficiently.
TABLE I: Overhead when compared to a simple two-level
NoC
Configuration Latency Area Power
Deterministic 6,5% 9,6% 12,3%
Hop-based 8,3% 6,4% 5,1%
Weighted-2D 12,6% 14,3% 8,5%
Bounded 14,3% 8,6% 7,3%
NOE 7,8% 7,2% 5,8%
TABLE II: Security evaluation results
Attack scenario Exahus. Hop Weigh. Bound. NOE
Overwrite 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
memory
Read mem. 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Repeated 100% 86% 84% 100% 100%
packet
Wrong dest. 100% 87% 93% 100% 100%
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